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ICT platforms and regulatory concerns in Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
 
ICT systems and services are increasingly characterised by technical and product 
modularity. Modularity refers to the design of systems and artefacts as sets of discrete 
modules that connect to each other via predetermined interfaces, and is a practical solution to 
deal with the increasing complexity and systemic nature of ICTs (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). 
This development has prompted some authors to expect an era of market modularity, in which 
competition between small, unbundled companies flourishes, and regulatory concerns 
dissipate (see e.g. Langlois, 2003). Instead, it is now becoming accepted knowledge that in 
such a context, platforms arise as central components that enable their providers to operate as 
gatekeepers of information and value flows between multiple groups of stakeholders (Gawer, 
2009a). High-profile ICT platforms include the Apple or Google smartphone and computer 
platforms, that act as gatekeepers towards a.o. content and application providers; and the 
digital TV platforms of cable, DSL and satellite operators such as Sky or Numericable, which 
are gatekeepers of TV broadcast channels, end-user interactivity and even advertisements. 
The emergence of these so-called multi-sided platforms implies that policy makers and 
regulators should not take for granted that simply allowing and facilitating the convergence 
between IT, internet, telecommunications and media services and technologies will result in 
an unbundled, open marketplace in which competition will flourish (Ballon, 2009). Rather, 
the bottleneck function of platforms may trigger serious regulatory concerns, and may prove 
to be harder to delineate and to regulate than bottlenecks in the current access operator 
market. On the other hand, the specific nature of platforms implies that many traditional 
suspicions against firms setting non-cost oriented prices, introducing cross-subsidies and 
engaging in collaborations to set a de facto industry standard, lose (some of) their validity in a 
multi-sided market context (Poel et al, 2007; Wright, 2004). This article will argue that this 
requires policy makers and regulators to acknowledge and incorporate the platform logic and 
characteristics into electronic communications regulation. 
There are other challenges for regulators. Increasingly, platforms originating in entirely 
different sectors compete directly against each other. One example are mobile application 
stores, web portals, mobile phone operating systems, and network operator platforms, all 
attempting to be the main entry point for the consumption of applications on smartphones. It 
will be argued here that the aim of not putting one particular class of competing platforms at a 
disadvantage, is likely to lead to a certain regulatory convergence, in the sense that access 
operators may become regulated more lightly, and other platform owners more heavily, than 
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is the case today. This implies that platform activities should be considered and appraised 
according to their business model within the converged ICT landscape, instead of according 
to the specific activities performed within the isolated relevant markets as they are commonly 
defined in Europe today.  
The first objective of this article is therefore to highlight the particular relevance of 
platform analysis for understanding present-day developments in ICT markets. To this end, 
the article identifies various types of platform business models in ICT markets and analyses 
them according to the form of control that is exercised by the platform owner. The second 
objective is to indicate how such analysis could be taken on board in the regulation of 
electronic communications and ICT markets in Europe. This exploratory exercise will take 
the form of a preliminary assessment of whether and how existing regulatory frameworks 
may accommodate regulation that is more platform aware.  
The outline is as follows. First, the concept of platforms, arising around crucial 
gatekeeper functionalities, is introduced. Subsequently, it is argued that ICT markets are 
particular platform markets in the sense that they harbour a large variety of platform business 
models, which can be fitted into a platform typology. Following this, a short introduction is 
given related to EU policy concerns over platforms, and a number of potential tools for 
regulatory intervention are outlined. Finally, these are related to potential regulatory concerns 
for the platform types that can be distinguished, so as to arrive at a number of prescriptive 
suggestions for regulation. 
 
2. The rise of platforms 
 
A central feature of ICT products and services is their modularity. The key question in 
research on modularity is the mirroring hypothesis, that is the hypothesis that technical and 
product modularity will be reflected in firm and industry modularity (Baldwin, 2007; Colfer, 
2007). As the most prominent defender of the mirroring hypothesis, Langlois (2003) has 
argued that modular product and process architectures have made hierarchical coordination in 
many instances unnecessary. As a result, he has argued that the Chandlerian visible hand of 
big corporations is vanishing, and that vertical integration in industries is increasingly 
disappearing. Others such as Ernst (2005) have been more cautious, and have concluded that 
technical modularity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for market modularity. Still 
others have asserted that modularity would even lead to various new forms of vertical 
coordination, that is to “System Integrators not Legoland” (Pavitt, 2003), because of 
significant limits to the division of labour in many industries. 
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It can be argued that the nascent body of platform theory (Gawer, 2009a; Mikkola & 
Hansen, 2005; Roson, 2005) sketches out the contours of a potential synthesis of this dialectic 
between modular and integrated design architectures, and market structures. Gawer & 
Cusumano (2002) have characterised the appropriate strategy for firms operating in the 
context of modular ICT systems, as the quest for platform leadership. This refers to the 
strategic objective to control a central system module around which other companies may 
develop a range of complementary technologies and products. It has been confirmed by West 
(2003) that leading ICT firms are increasingly opting for hybrid, ‘open but not open’ 
strategies that attempt to combine the advantages of open technology development while 
retaining the ability to control and differentiate. In effect, the success of firms such as Intel, 
Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Apple has been attributed to the fact that they have been 
able to position themselves as ‘platforms’ within their business ecosystem. Moreover, the 
main dynamics and upheavals affecting ICT markets today are increasingly being framed, 
either implicitly or explicitly, as resulting from the struggles between IT, internet, telecom 
and media giants for platform leadership within a converged ICT landscape (see e.g. 
Greenstein, 2009).  
Consequently, the concept of platforms, their characteristics and behaviour, have 
become increasingly singled out for deeper analysis. While platforms in manufacturing are an 
established concept (Meyer & Utterback, 1993; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992), it is often 
remarked that platforms in information products industries may require a different set of 
concepts (Salonen, 2004; McGrath, 2001; Bresnahan, 1999). Technically, an ICT platform 
may refer to a hardware configuration, an operating system, a software framework or any 
other common entity on which a number of associated components or services run. 
Economically, platforms and their providers mediate and coordinate between various 
stakeholder constituencies. Platform owners’ business models, rather than to focus on profit 
maximisation in a single market, primarily deal with getting the various stakeholder groups 
on board, with balancing interests between these groups and with balancing openness and 
lock-in of customers (Cortade, 2006). It has also been stressed that ICT platforms have a 
durable and structural character (Bresnahan, 1999). This results from the fact that they have 
interchangeable components, so that many buyers can share the benefits of the same technical 
advance, introducing network effects into the economics of ICT platforms, and causing 
platforms to be hard to start, hard to stop, but generally easy to maintain.  
Most literature refers to the concept of bottlenecks to explain how platforms arise. 
Baldwin and Clark (2006) suggest that successful firms are those that possess architectural 
knowledge about bottlenecks and use this knowledge in order to shrink their footprint and 
selectively outsource activities. In this way, they gain an advantage in terms of invested 
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capital, while keeping control over the most critical bottlenecks. Similarly, Jacobides et al 
(2006) argue that firms can benefit from innovation by managing the industry’s architecture 
carefully so they become the bottlenecks of their industry. Jacobides et al. (2006) envisage 
bottleneck ownership and exploitation in terms of architectural advantage, and define 
bottlenecks in a strategic way, that is as segments where mobility (both in terms of switching 
costs and potential entry) is limited and competition is softened.  
Another common explanation of platform ownership lies in the ownership and 
specification of particular critical interfaces (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Obviously, the 
question is then why interfaces arise at certain points. Baldwin (2007) has provided an 
argument for this based on transaction cost theory. She argues that interfaces tend to arise at 
thin crossing points within a task network. Thin crossing points are associated with low 
transaction costs, (e.g. the costs of defining, counting, and paying for things transferred) and 
with information hiding between the various stakeholders. 
The related concept of gatekeeper functionalities (Ballon, 2009) adds the dimension of 
critical information processing capabilities to the bottleneck and transaction cost arguments. It 
joins the idea of the role of a platform gatekeeper (see e.g. Farrell & Weiser, 2003; Baye & 
Morgan, 2001), controlling access in modular or partly-modular systems, with the concept of 
information gatekeepers, which is commonly used in media and communication studies to 
describe persons and organisations selecting and processing ideas and information (see e.g. 
Shoemaker, 1996; Lewin, 1951). Included in this concept is the notion that gatekeepers not 
only filter and select information (i.e. the gatekeeper acts as a bottleneck) but also 
qualitatively alter the informational content (for better or for worse) through active 
accumulation, processing and packaging (i.e. the gatekeeper adds critical ‘value’). The 
gatekeeper concept is thus linked to specific information gathering, processing and filtering 
functionalities that enable its owners to adopt a platform position within the value network.  
In the context of ICT platforms, this implies that gatekeeper functionalities, 
corresponding to a number of specific business roles, are instrumental in strategies to make 
available information and communication resources and thereby attract great numbers of 
customers, but at the same time allow to control various types of customers. This double 
function also refers to the concept of a ‘business model’ as the specific way in which value 
and control parameters are configured within a certain value network, and to which a whole 
‘ecosystem’ of stakeholders, willingly or not, adheres (Ballon, 2007a). A platform should 
therefore not be considered as a given architectural and organisational entity, but as a 
collection of a number of crucial gatekeeper roles that may be used to attract as well as to 
lock in (at least to some extent) various types of customers. These roles may be configured in 
various ways and at various levels of the technical architecture, and may be owned and 
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operated by different business entities. Only when considered in this way, does it become 
conceivable that companies specialising in completely different system components, such as 
telecom networks, end-user devices, operating systems (OSs), web browsers, content portals, 
web applications, and so on, could be involved in head-on competition for platform 
leadership in various ICT markets.  
It can be summarised that, rather than modularisation, ICT markets are instead 
characterised by far-reaching ‘platformisation’ (Ballon, 2009). In such markets, platform 
leaders have built a business model around a set of crucial gatekeeper functionalities and roles 
that help them to exercise a form of control over the wider value network, and to add and 
capture significant value in the process. The form that this control takes in practice may differ 
and shift strongly between various platforms, and as platforms evolve. This is still a rather 
under-researched area. There is a growing body of literature that is focused on highlighting 
and formalising competition between platforms. However, as the next section argues, more 
attention should be devoted to shifting platform strategies and business models, and the 
associated control configurations, especially when analysing platforms in ICT markets. 
 
Platform Behaviour and Competition in ICT Markets 
Two-sided and multi-sided networks literature refers to platforms as mediating entities 
between agents that operate on different sides of the market, and whose utility is affected by 
participation and usage on the opposite side(s) (see e.g. Armstrong, 2004; Jullien, 2004; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Much of this literature offers a rather ‘static’ analysis in the sense 
that it concentrates on price equilibrium and allocative efficiency for a single platform or in 
relation to competition between two platforms. It has been argued that the indirect (i.e. 
between the groups at different sides of the platform) externalities that characterise platforms 
are linked to their function as ‘informational intermediaries’ (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003), so 
ICT platforms can be considered as typical cases in point. However, although most authors 
incorporate at least some examples from the ICT industry, relatively few have pointed at any 
specific characteristics of platforms and platform competition in the ICT domain.  
Still, some particularities have been noted. First, ICT-specific literature on platform 
markets tends to stress the dynamic and complex nature of competition between a large 
number of platforms or platform ‘wannabes’. For instance, Church & Gandal (2005) have 
pointed at the drawn-out standards wars related to the Instant Messaging, 56K Modems and 
mobile cellular markets, highlighting a considerable number of dynamically evolving factors 
affecting the establishment and behaviour of platforms.  
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Also, authors writing on the specifics of two-sided markets in the ICT domain tend to 
emphasise the influence of technological configurations. In the ICT industry, controlling a 
platform in the economic sense is commonly (yet not necessarily) associated with controlling 
a platform in the technological sense, i.e. a hardware configuration, an operating system, a 
software framework or any other common entity on which a number of associated 
components or services run. Issues of interoperability, of open and proprietary interfaces and 
standards, and of bundling and adding features by the platform are much more pronounced in 
the ICT industry than in most other industries (see e.g. Evans et al, 2005).  
Third, these authors often imply that there is a greater scope in the ICT domain for 
strategic decision-making regarding the option of organising a business as a platform market. 
So, the decision to adopt a multi-sided platform strategy, similar to the decision whether or 
not to vertically integrate, does not have an evident outcome in many ICT markets, and may 
evolve rapidly, dependent on the specificities of the evolving technology and market 
environments.  
Finally, authors (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Spulber, 2009) have also pointed at the role 
of digital (but also non-digital) platforms as “private regulators”, who use “nuanced 
combinations” of legal, technological, informational and other instruments that are far more 
extensive than simply ‘getting prices right’. 
Despite such valuable attempts to contextualise platforms and platform markets, the 
notion of a platform is still mostly considered as a given, i.e. as an abstraction that allows 
generally valid analysis and comparison. In opposition to this, and particularly in relation to 
studying the ICT industry, a number of authors (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2008; Ballon, 2007b; 
Boudreau, 2005) argue that real-life platforms exhibit strong heterogeneity in terms of the 
configuration of components and boundaries, in terms of integration and compatibility 
strategies, of revenue (sharing) models and even in terms of the associated regulatory 
concerns - to the point that the terms ‘platform’ and ‘platform strategy’ to capture all these 
initiatives lose most of their explanatory power.  
Consequently, they argue that research needs to abandon abstract and static conceptions 
of a “platform”, and instead should concern itself with changing boundaries of platforms, 
different types of platform business models, and various levels of integration and control.  
 
A Typology of Platform Business Models 
Delving further into this notion of different types of (ICT) platforms exerting different 
forms of control in the market through the employment of different business models - and 
 7 
thus potentially giving rise to different regulatory concerns -, the first step to refine the 
analysis of platform markets is to introduce a platform typology, based on the control 
configurations associated with these platforms. This platform typology (originally introduced 
in Ballon, 2009) takes as point of departure the notion that all platforms aim at the control 
over a set of crucial ‘gatekeeper functionalities’ (see above), but may differ fundamentally 
both in terms of the control they have over the set of additional business roles that they 
integrate beyond this, and over the so-called end customers of the platform.  
Rather few authors have devoted attention until now to the specific characteristics of, 
and differences between, several types of platforms. And while a few authors have tentatively 
put forward platform typologies, their supposedly mutually exclusive categories are more 
often than not found in combination in the ICT industries. This is true for the distinction 
between active matching versus passive mediation services of Schiff (2003), proprietary 
versus shared technologies as proposed by Eisenmann (2007), and the matchmaking, 
audience making, transaction-based and ‘shared-input’ platforms of Evans et al (2005). In 
addition, Gawer (2009b) has recently introduced a more general typology of platforms 
composed of platforms that are internal to firms, supply chain platforms, and industry 
platforms. While it is a useful conceptual distinction, it has less direct merit for the topic of 
this article, as it does not allow in itself to distinguish the potential competitive bottlenecks 
involved. 
The platform typology adopted here instead distinguishes between platforms according 
to the control they exert beyond the gatekeeper functionalities. As argued above, platform 
leaders can be defined as agents operating crucial gatekeeper roles. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the platform owner also has control over the customer (i.e. end-user) 
relationship, or has control over the assets needed to ‘assemble’ the value proposition of the 
goods and services traded over the platform. In fact, this typology reflects the central tenet of 
platform literature that these forms of control can and will to an extent reside outside of the 
platform (making the platform model ‘open’), while the platform only monopolises control 
over the roles that bestow most ‘architectural advantage’ (making the platform model ‘open 
but not open’). Reinterpreting the business models currently employed in the ICT industry in 
this light, four basic platform types can be distinguished (see also Ballon, 2009).  
The first type of platform, that keeps its distance from the eventual value proposition as 
well as from the customer relationship, can be labelled a ‘Neutral Platform’. This refers to a 
case in which the platform owner does not control most of the assets necessary for the value 
proposition (because apart from controlling the gatekeeper roles it has hardly any assets 
related to the value proposition itself), and on top of this does not have customer ownership 
(because it does not establish a billing relationship with the end-
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invisible to the end-user). Paypal and Google search are typical cases in point. The Google 
search engine platform, for instance, does not intervene with the specification or offering of 
the content and services to which it refers people. Also, customer lock-in is minimal, and no 
subscription or billing relationship with the user exists. Still, Google is able to internalise a 
significant part of the externalities created, through the capturing of advertisement revenues, 
both on its search portal and on a significant number of affiliated websites. 
The second type could be labelled a ‘Broker Platform’. In this case, the platform relies 
on other actors that control most of the assets for establishing the value proposition, but does 
integrate customer ownership. Facebook and eBay are typical examples of such a broker 
platform. In the case of eBay, the independent sellers provide the value proposition to the 
buyers, with eBay merely offering the place where both constituencies meet. Yet, in terms of 
the customer relationship, people are very aware of the brand (and associated guarantees) of 
eBay, and generally do not know or care about the seller’s identity (except for the data on past 
purchases, which eBay provides). Also, eBay supports the transaction and billing process, 
which is another important aspect of customer ownership.  
The third type of platform can be labelled an ‘Enabler Platform’. This refers to the case 
where the platform owner controls many or most of the assets involved in service provision, 
but leaves the customer relationship to third-party developers. The IMS platform or the Intel 
platform may be seen as examples of this type. For instance, Intel has a firm grip on the 
hardware architecture, standards and application programming interfaces, and represents of a 
large part of the value-add, of any Intel-powered Personal Computer (PC). Thus, it controls 
several of the assets involved in the PC value proposition, which is highlighted by the ‘Intel 
inside’ quality label. At the same time, the main PC brand that consumers recognise is still 
that of the PC manufacturer, who also takes care of the marketing, sales and aftersales 
through its retail channels. 
The fourth type of platform can be labelled a ‘System Integrator Platform’. This 
represents the case where many or most of the assets related to the value proposition, as well 
as the customer ownership, are in the hands of the platform owner. Still, this actor actively 
facilitates and encourages entry of ‘third parties’ to constitute a multi-sided market, e.g. by 
not ‘squeezing’ complementary actors out of the market. In other words, it allows competing 
service providers to use its platform, in order to increase the value of both this platform and 
its own end-user service offering. Typical examples of such a platform model are the 
Microsoft Windows Platform and the Apple iPhone. In the case of the iPhone, Apple controls 
the hardware, OS and other middleware components, the App Store portal and transaction 
system, as well as several individual applications themselves. It is able to extract significant 
rents and set barriers to exit for application providers. Moreover, it controls the relationship 
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with end-users in terms of branding, finding and selecting applications, and paying for it. 
Still, it acts as a platform, actively promoting the addition of a multitude of application 
developers to the iPhone application ‘ecosystem’ through an easily available software 
development kit, application developer programmes, a transparent and uniform revenue 
sharing model, and so on.  
This bird’s eye overview illustrates the diversity of various (and often competing) ICT 
platforms. It also demonstrates that platforms that control the same gatekeeper roles (e.g. 
collecting and processing profile data, or enabling transactions), may have radically different 
types of business models, dependent on to what degree they control the value proposition and 
the customer relationship of the services that make use of the platform. In summary, the 
proposed platform typology, based on these control and value-related parameters, can be 
represented as follows: 
Table 1: Typology of Platform Models (see also Ballon, 2009) 	   No Control over Customers	   Control over Customers	  
Neutral Platform	   Broker Platform	  
The platform owner is strongly 
reliant on the assets of other actors 
to create the value proposition, and 
does not control the customer 
relationship	  
The platform owner is strongly 
reliant on the assets of other actors 
to create the value proposition, but 
does control the customer 
relationship	  
No Control over 
Assets	  
Examples: Google search, PayPal 	   Examples: Facebook, eBay	  
Enabler Platform	   System Integrator Platform	  
The platform owner controls many 
of the necessary assets to ensure 
the value proposition, but does not 
control the customer relationship	  
The platform owner controls many 
of the assets to ensure the value 
proposition, and establishes a 
relationship with end-users. Entry 
of ‘third-party’ service providers is 
actively encouraged	  
Control over 
Assets 	  
Examples: Intel, IMS 	   Examples: Apple iPhone, Microsoft 
OS	  
 
Naturally, this typology needs to be further refined and validated. However, we suggest 
that it may serve to operationalise various forms of control leading to different platform 
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models, to explore the different characteristics of the platform types and to link these to 
various outcomes in terms of value being created for service developers as well as for end 
users.  
 
Platforms and Regulatory Concerns 
 
The bottleneck function of platforms, and the various control patterns that can be 
distinguished in platform business models, indicate that a specific analysis of the potential 
regulatory concerns may be useful. The following sections explore the relevance of platforms 
for the current European regulatory framework, and vice versa. 
When assessing the impact of market developments on regulation, two fundamental 
questions typically impose themselves, i.e. whether ex ante intervention is necessary/desirable 
or not; and, related to this, whether sector-specific regulation is necessary/desirable or not. In 
this context, it needs to be considered that competition law in principle (but not always) 
intervenes after the fact, and is triggered by intended (e.g. in the case of a notification of a 
merger) or perceived behaviour. This may create a number of issues in fast evolving sectors 
such as the ICT industry. In contrast, sector-specific regulation intervenes ex ante, by 
imposing rules even when there is no abusive conduct, but only the potentiality of abuse 
according to EU guidelines. This causes an asymmetrical situation, in which obligations are 
enforced upon the strongest players, and rights bestowed upon weaker players.  
In electronic communications, access operators are historically regulated in an ex ante 
fashion because they are deemed to control essential facilities and because the prospects for 
competition are regarded as limited. In other parts of the ICT industry, dominant players are 
regulated ex post under competition law. Still, it is important to realise that sector-specific, ex 
ante regulation is based methodologically on the rules of competition law, pertaining e.g. to 
the delineation of markets, the assessment of individual or common dominance or significant 
market power, the identification of market failure due to barriers to market entry, and 
eventually the imposition of remedies. In fact, it has been argued that since the introduction of 
the so-called new regime for regulating electronic communications services, which came into 
force in Europe in 2003, sector-specific regulation in the electronic communications sector 
has evolved towards a sort of ‘ex ante anti-trust framework’ (Cave, 2004; De Streel, 2004). In 
general, this framework can be characterised as mainly focused on the analysis and regulation 
of specific, isolated, ‘one-sided’ markets (Wauthy, 2008; Poel et al, 2007). 
The emergence and pervasiveness of platforms seemingly necessitate a reappraisal of 
some of these basic orientations. First of all, it can be argued that platforms should be at the 
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centre of attention of regulators. It was already indicated that the abundance and 
commoditisation created on different sides of a multi-sided platform is as a rule accompanied 
by various business models and strategies of control and scarcity around a set of gatekeeper 
functionalities. Platforms, by their nature, exhibit strong concentration tendencies, because of 
the network effects inherent in platforms (Wauthy, 2008; Bresnahan, 1999). Also, they have 
the potential to exert market power into adjacent markets, i.e. those markets for 
complementary products and services.  
Therefore, the value of ‘open’ or neutral platforms, allowing multihoming of service 
providers and end-users, as well as the importance of inter-platform standardisation, including 
voluntary or mandated compatibility, interoperability, and interconnection, have been stressed 
by several authors (see e.g. Johnson, 2009; Church & Gandal, 2005), even though there is no 
consensus around any potentially associated regulatory measures. In any case, such 
arguments also appear to underlie the current calls for net neutrality, i.e. the ex ante regulation 
of telecom operators’ involvement in, and treatment of, internet content and services. In the 
EU, the initial reluctance to resort to mandated net neutrality seems to have lessened to some 
extent, and a public consultation on net neutrality was opened in 2010 (see e.g. Marsden, 
2010; Renda, 2008).  
Net neutrality can be interpreted as imposing ‘platform neutrality’ at the access 
operator level. However, the typology and examples proposed earlier suggest that platforms 
may arise practically everywhere within the ICT industry, and that direct competition is 
feasible between platforms operating in entirely different parts of the value chain. This also 
means that access operators are no longer the only type of player exploiting bottlenecks or 
controlling the electronic communications market. Therefore, it seems fair to say that 
concerns over abuse of market power should not be limited to access operators alone. In fact, 
several pleas have already been made for policy makers and regulators, who have so far 
focused mainly on access operators, to adapt to this new situation, and to evolve towards 
some kind of ‘platform neutrality’ (see e.g. Williamson & Marks, 2009; Arino, 2007).  
The recent Digital Agenda for Europa appears to acknowledge the need to adapt the 
regulatory framework to the reality of platform markets. It was launched by EU commissioner 
Kroes in May 2010 as a comprehensive action plan, to be implemented through a range of 
follow-up actions including legislative proposals. It identifies seven priority areas for action, 
i.e. creating a digital Single Market, greater interoperability, boosting internet trust and 
security, much faster internet access, more investment in research and development, 
enhancing digital literacy skills and inclusion and applying information and communications 
technologies to address challenges facing society like climate change and the ageing 
population. One striking aspect of the Digital Agenda is that it foresees new European 
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interoperability rules for the electronic communications industry, based on antitrust rules 
related to the abuse of market position, referring in this case to a significant, instead of 
dominant, position. In this case, obligations will be imposed related to licence interoperability 
information, to ensure consumer choice in software as well as hardware. It should be noted 
that this pertains to technical platforms, while the analysis in this paper extends also to pure 
service platforms. 
In the same context, Commissioner Kroes has expressed concern over the market 
position and conduct of Apple, in particular in relation to the interoperability between various 
smartphone platforms. Observers disagree about the extent to which a similar case can be 
built by the Commission, as was done related to the openness of the Microsoft platform. 
Meanwhile, the EU announced that it would drop two anti-trust investigations related to the 
Apple iPhone platform. One issue for any intervention is to determine the appropriate 
‘relevant market’ (see further). Another issue is that, as argued by Wauthy (2008), currently 
no clear, general principle exists about how to regulate platforms, and regulators have no 
operational frameworks that can easily accommodate the particular characteristics of platform 
markets - such as the existence of externalities across different sides of the platform, and the 
complex effects of multi-homing of service providers and/or end users. Still, it is clear that 
there is a growing awareness of and concern over the position and potential abuse of market 
power by platform owners in the electronic communications industry.    
However, the characteristics of platforms provide also a number of reasons to mitigate 
concerns and/or intervention. A platform coordinates interactions between two or more 
distinct groups of stakeholders and is able to internalise the externalities created by one group 
for the other group. Business models in multi-sided platform markets, rather than to focus on 
profit maximisation in a single market, primarily deal with getting the various stakeholder 
groups on board, balancing interests between these groups and with single- or multi-homing 
of customers (i.e. whether customers are tied to one or more platforms) (Evans, 2003). This 
means that, in a multi-sided market, a viable pricing strategy could consist of subsidizing one 
side to attract customers on the other. This implies that competition policy analysis cannot 
consider prices separately, and should not regard a strategy based on cross subsidies as 
predatory in many instances (Cortade, 2006; Wright, 2004). 
It has also been argued that regulators who impose price regulations and other 
restrictions on one specific (type of) actor(s), seldom take into account the impact of such 
regulation on the entire value network, which is especially relevant in the case of multi-sided 
platforms. Also, they regularly fail to distinguish between bundling as an integral part of any 
multi-sided platform business and ‘bundling as a way to leverage monopoly’, and may be 
overly suspicious of collaboration between competitors within the same layer in view of 
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creating a de facto industry standard. It follows that policy makers and regulators ought to use 
a more holistic framework, which may shift the emphasis from traditional policy analysis 
based on specific policy domains or isolated ‘relevant markets’, towards the relevant 
determinants for successful platform models (Poel et al, 2007). 
Pardolesi & Renda (2004) give the example of the 2004 European ruling against 
Microsoft for leveraging its market power in the client PC operating system market into the 
adjacent market of servers. They argue that the standard way of market definition that was 
performed and the subsequent condemnation of Microsoft for preserving privileged 
connections between its client PC platform and its work group server operating system, are 
both deeply flawed, because they fail to take into account that Microsoft was not merely 
competing in the server market, but rather against much more encompassing ‘razor-and-
blade’ (i.e. built around cross-subsidisation between server sales and service contracts) 
business models used by competitors such as Sun and IBM.  
In summary, there have traditionally been reasons for regulating some platforms and 
not others. In electronic communications, access operators are regulated in an ex ante fashion 
because they control essential facilities and because the prospects for competition are 
regarded as limited. In other parts of the ICT industry, dominant players are regulated ex post 
under competition law. Under the new Digital Agenda, Europe appears to open the door 
towards regulating platforms in general, i.e. the access to platforms, the interoperability 
between platforms, and so on. However, it seems that no operational framework currently 
exists that can easily accommodate the specific characteristics of platforms. Also, it was 
argued that for any platform regulation to be effective and not to veer into over-regulation, it 
is indispensable to take into account the specific business models employed by the platform 
owners. The remaining sections will focus on the applicability of the current regulatory 
framework, and will propose a number of directions for taking into account platform business 
models. 
 
Tools for Regulatory Intervention 
This section deals with the way regulators may intervene in platform markets, if at all 
necessary, to ensure the development of the market and citizens’ rights to pluriformity, 
choice, affordable tariffs, quality and innovation, and which role the existing ex ante and ex 
post frameworks can play in this. First, it will be argued that there is a need to start a 
theoretical analysis at the EU level on the competitive risks and regulatory challenges posed 
by various platform models. Second, it is proposed that anti-trust and sector-specific 
approaches towards platform regulation can be complementary, and that specific cost-benefit 
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analyses need to be performed to determine whether ex ante regulation of specific platform 
models is necessary. Third, the applicability of the three-step approach, which is somewhat 
similar in both ex post and ex ante regulation, and the new recommendation on next 
generation access networks, are briefly discussed. 
It was already asserted that at this stage, one of the primary issues for regulators is the 
lack of any framework or set of principles with which to approach platform markets. Given 
the lack of practical expertise related to this matter among European regulators, it appears to 
be a valid approach to start with a more theoretical exercise, related to building a number of 
hypotheses on potential problems, related to various platform models. This may be followed 
by an analysis of the probability and impact of any distortion of competition. Because of the 
often limited grip and oversight of national regulators related to ICT platforms, and for 
harmonisation reasons, it seems that this should take place primarily at the European level 
(see also further). 
The European Commission (EC), in cooperation with the European Regulatory Group 
(ERG) – which has been more or less transformed meanwhile into BEREC (Body of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communication) - in fact performed a similar analysis at 
the time of liberalising the telecom markets, and afterwards when reviewing the directives. 
This has led to a corpus of rules, based on theory as well as on practice, for regulating the 
electronic communications market. Those rules are sector-specific, but closely linked to 
competition law. They are almost exclusively aimed at the access markets, i.e. at the 
regulation of networks, as up to the present day this has been an area characterised by major 
competition issues. This then raises the issue whether, mutatis mutandis, this method might be 
applicable in the context of multi-sided markets at different levels of the industry. 
Related to the applicability of anti-trust versus sector-specific approaches, recent 
studies have indicated that antitrust and sector-specific regulations in the ICT domain, while 
converging to some extent, will remain complementary in the foreseeable future, in the sense 
that antitrust regulation is best equipped to deal with the conduct of economic agents, while 
sector-specific regulation may be preferred to tackle a number of issues related to market 
structure. De Streel (2008), for instance, argues that sector regulation should (only) be applied 
when it is more efficient than antitrust to solve market failures, i.e. when there are vertical 
chains of production rather than horizontal markets, structural (economic or legal) entry 
barriers, or network effects across multiple sides of the market. It is clear that platform 
markets fall within this scope. He also proposes that, in order to alleviate confusion between 
antitrust and sector regulation objectives, it would be better to base sector regulation on an 
independent economic concept linked to the goals of regulation. In this respect, authors such 
as Richards (2006) and Larouche (2000) have argued that sector regulation should centre on 
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the concept of ‘bottlenecks’. Again, the link to the gatekeeper function of platforms is 
evident. The subsequent section of this paper will therefore further follow this approach. Still, 
it should also be remarked that, in such a complex situation, a cost-benefit analysis of ex ante 
regulation will be absolutely necessary. This is because the danger of over-regulating and 
substantially slowing down market developments is real (see also Renda, 2008). 
Turning to the experience of EU regulation in the electronic communications domain, 
this is primarily contained in two Directives, i.e. the Access Directive and the Universal 
Service Directive (20021); in a Recommendation related to relevant markets; and in an ERG 
paper (ERG, 2005) on the method for market analysis. In summary, the methodology 
demands that the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) take a three step approach before 
applying regulation. It is important to note that they have to perform a sort of Cost/Benefit 
analysis to assess whether their planned measures make sense. This anticipates in a sense the 
assessment between ex post and ex ante intervention. 
The three steps are the following. First, there is the market definition. NRAs need to 
carefully delineate which very specific parts of the access markets will be analysed and if 
necessary will be subjected to remedies. This delineation is in large part based on the 
principles of competition law. The EC has taken this work out of the hands of the NRAs, by 
pre-defining an initial number of 18 markets, and subsequently, after a number of years of 
experience, limiting this to 7 markets (Commission Recommendation of 17 december 2007).  
Even though the Commission set up a complex system for NRAs to use when defining 
markets, the EC itself thus put forward a purely theoretical approach. The EC had veto power 
against irregular decisions in the Member States. This led de facto to the paradoxical situation 
that the factual determinations of the NRA risked to be forced into the framework of the 18, 
and subsequently 7, markets. In essence, the burden of proof was reversed, and the NRAs 
were obliged to prove that some of these market definitions were irrelevant. A case in point is 
the history of market 17, the roaming market, for which the EU in the end had to take the 
necessary decisions itself for it to be regulated at the European level. One may consider in 
this respect that the NRAs were unable to solve this issue, as they were incapable of 
regulating termination tariffs of foreign operators. Also, Europe was in this case imposing a 
decision that contradicted its own rules in two ways, i.e. by not applying the three-step 
approach, and by imposing maximum retail tariffs. All of this does not imply that such a 
theoretical exercise is not necessary, but rather that it should not be overly rigid, so as to 
define market segments that are relevant to the existing competition issues, and that the 
institutional design of European regulation is lacking in this respect. 
                                                      
1 It was reviewed in December 2009, with no major impact on the topic of this paper, except 
concerning net neutrality and net freedom; see further. 
 16 
It should be noted in this respect that market definitions necessarily also entail an 
investigation into the position of users. Instead of being involved merely as passive 
consumers, they determine, through their choices, and the cross-market externalities, the 
value and market shares of the specific platforms (see also Caillaud & Jullien, 2003). Those 
choices are influenced by several factors, including tariffs, technologies, service offerings, 
expectations about the success and durability of a specific platform, usability, and so on. 
Additionally, there is the question of the extent to which consumers themselves may develop 
(e.g. content creation and/or distribution) platforms, or at least strongly influence them. This 
is a separate question related a.o. to participation, interactivity and access.   
The second step in present regulation is that of market analysis. It is analysed what the 
relative weight (i.e. the market share) is of various businesses operating within a defined 
market, and whether there are sufficient opportunities for other companies to enter the market 
with chances of success, or to further develop themselves. The assessment of whether a 
market functions well or not is again based on competition rules. Three criteria are important 
in this respect, i.e. high and non-temporary barriers to entry in a market, the dynamic state of 
competition behind these barriers to entry, and the question of whether existing competition 
law is sufficient or not. The level of competition is assessed by analysing substitutability on 
the demand as well as the supply side, using the hypothetical monopolist test for groups of 
services that are used by consumers for the same purpose (see e.g. Nihoul & Rodford, 2004). 
The ERG paper (2003) points at four sorts of potential competition issues. This paper is 
based on the experience of the NRAs, and has been thoroughly checked, over a long period of 
time, against the European rules. It distinguishes vertical leveraging, horizontal leveraging, 
single market dominance, and termination. While termination is a typical problem of access 
markets, and therefore does not directly apply to platforms in general, the three other concepts 
are very relevant. They pertain to whether or not to regulate ex ante, but also serve as 
instruments for ex post analyses based on competition law. Related to vertical leveraging, the 
ERG paper sums up the following standard problems: refusal to deal/denial of access, 
discriminatory use or withholding of information, delaying tactics, bundling/tying, undue 
requirements, quality discrimination, strategic design of product, undue use of information 
about competitors, price discrimination, cross-subsidisation and predatory pricing. For 
horizontal leveraging, the paper cites bundling/tying on one hand, and cross-subsidisation on 
the other hand. Finally, for single market dominance (a sort of textbook monopoly 
behaviour), it distinguishes: strategic design of product or contract terms to raise consumers’ 
switching costs, exclusive dealing, over-investment, predatory pricing, excessive pricing, 
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price discrimination, lack of investment, excessive costs/inefficiency and low quality.2 These 
are all important ‘touchstones’ for regulators, both NRAs and NCAs (National Competition 
Authorities). A serious complication of such analysis in the context of multi-sided platforms, 
is that it needs to take into account inter-technological competition, e.g. between DSL, coax, 
DVB-T and mobile access networks, or between various digital TV and web TV platforms. 
Furthermore, market share as a measure of dominance or significant market power in multi-
sided markets is harder to establish compared to the access markets that are traditionally 
scrutinised, and may also be less relevant, given the fact that smaller platform owners may 
also abuse their power. Also, as the subsequent section will further highlight, the risk of 
market distortions will be different for each of the four types of platforms distinguished 
earlier.  
The third step is then to impose remedies, if necessary. The European framework 
foresees a number of measures that can be taken ex ante. They are principally aimed at the 
wholesale market and derive from the Access Directive or (related to the retail level) the 
Universal Service Directive. However, as they essentially pertain to the regulation of 
networks, they cannot be applied as such for regulating the platforms reviewed here. The 
most important remedies in the Access Directive in this specific context are: transparency, 
non-discrimination, accounting separation, co-location and facility sharing, technical 
standards, price control, cost orientation, and publication and access to information (in the 
context of potential obligations to grant access to networks/platforms). NRAs can choose to 
enforce these remedies separately or in combination. Again, several of these remedies appear 
to be applicable to platform owners, at least if the existing strong suspicions of vertical 
leveraging, cross-subsidies etc. are upheld (see further). Recently, the EC has gone one step 
further. Its recommendation on regulated access to Next-Generation Access Networks 
provides a view of the remedies that a dominant or monopolist access platform owner in the 
era of fibre access networks can expect. 
                                                      
2 One important element, applicable to the position of multi-sided platforms, is 
included in article 3 of the Services Directive: “...that vertical integrated public undertakings 
which provide electronic Communications networks and which are in a dominant position do 
not discriminate in favour of their own activities.” Reference is naturally also made in the 
Framework Directive (art. 14 (3)): “Where an undertaking has significant market power on a 
specific market, it may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related 
market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the market power held 
in one market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market power 
of the undertaking.” 
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This Commission Recommendation of 20 September 2010 on regulated access to Next 
Generations Access Networks lays down the principles that national regulators need to follow 
in order to face the challenge of the restructuring of the access network markets. This is 
because investments in fibre to the curb (FTTC) and fibre to the home (FTTH) architectures 
are promising to fundamentally change the network as well as the business topologies. 
Existing interconnections in exchanges, even down to the level of street cabinets, that have 
been introduced by operators in the framework of the unbundling of the local loop (ULL) or 
of bitstream access (BSA) may lose their function when FTTC and FTTH are introduced. 
This means that alternative operators not only lose these sunk investments, but they are also 
obliged to install new interconnection points in the incumbent’s network. Such a development 
strongly undermines the goal of the well-known Ladder of Investment doctrin, and bestows 
once again a competitive advantage onto the incumbent, i.e. related to adaptations to the 
network, exclusive information, delaying tactics and so on. This explains the need for a new 
Recommendation, which is based on the existing Directives but provides guidances to the 
NRAs on how to deal with the new access market issues.  
According to the Recommendation, the NRAs have the assignment to carry out 
permanent monitoring. They can force the SMP operator to provide a reference offer, impose 
transparency measures, full and timely information on the deployment of new infrastructure, 
and even a migration path including maintaining a parallel offering of copper next to the new 
fiber network; all of this including service level indicators. They have the possibility to 
enforce reciprocity in the sharing of infrastructure and facilities. The principles of cost 
orientation as well as non-discrimination are also maintained. At the technical level, the 
possibility is foreseen to oblige operators to apply common technical standards, 
independently of the network technology deployed, and to impose a design to allow several 
operators to deploy infrastructure. 
The range of measures is impressive, and essentially forces any operator investing in 
FTTC and FTTH into a regulatory straightjacket, when this is deemed necessary for a healthy 
market development. For now, it remains an open question whether this approach, mutatis 
mutandis, foreshadows the ex ante measures to prevent competitive bottlenecks by new ICT 
platforms.  
In summary, a thorough, preliminary investigation can be recommended of the 
potential risks that arise as a consequence of the multi-sided nature of many ICT markets, and 
which may be inspired by the current regulation of access markets. Such investigation must 
lead to a framework to guide NCAs, NRAs, and the EC. It may also yield two positive and 
important results, i.e. a harmonised approach among the member states and substantial gains 
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in time. It is up to the EC, and in first instance to the BEREC, to conduct this investigation 
and assess whether ex ante regulation is required, or whether ex post intervention suffices. 
Some remarks in this regard can already be made. First, anti-trust and sector-specific 
approaches towards platform regulation can be complementary, with sector-specific 
regulation oriented towards a specific concept linked to the goals of regulation, such as the 
removal of bottlenecks. However, in such a complex situation, a cost-benefit analysis of ex 
ante regulation is absolutely necessary. The danger of over-regulating and substantially 
slowing down market developments is real. Second, the new net neutrality regulations may 
partly provide a basis for a more general platform neutrality discussion. In fact, the new 
guidelines related to net neutrality foresee that regulators, in defence of consumer interests, 
have power to set minimum quality levels for functionalities delivered over the platform to 
various service providers, and to impose transparancy requirements (nature of the service, 
traffic management techniques, any other limitations such as bandwith caps and connection 
speed). Third, a range of related, strategic decisions need to be taken at the policy level, e.g. 
related to the question to what extent national regulation, in view of the international 
dimension of multisided markets, is still efficient, or should be replaced by European 
regulation. Finally, there is a need to make a distinction between normal or advantageous and 
non-acceptable platform strategies, related to e.g. bundling and leveraging strategies, as well 
as to the different risks posed by different types of platform business models. This will be 
treated further in the next section. 
 
Towards a Regulatory Framework for Different Platform Models 
Given the fact that recognition of the specific nature of platforms and the associated 
regulatory concerns came only recently, it is unavoidable that European policy makers and 
regulators are currently uncertain about the necessity for intervention (i.e. ex ante or ex post), 
and a fortiori about the basis and methodology for potential intervention. This is partly a 
consequence of the fact that platform markets do not fit the relevant market scheme as 
defined in the European system, and partly the consequence of the fact that very diverse types 
of companies may be involved. Many, if not most of these companies do not have to comply 
so far to any sector-specific regulation. This also poses the question of regulated access 
providers being confronted with non-regulated competitors. In addition, the dominant  
regulatory instrument used in the electronic communication sector, i.e. the analysis of 
wholesale and retail tariffs, is not always applicable. As indicated earlier, platform companies 
operating in multi-sided markets may offer product and service bundles, with prices set at 
each side that are often not cost-oriented, without this necessarily leading to a decrease in 
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consumer surplus. Both lawmakers and regulators therefore will have to display a high level 
of inventiveness in order to deal with these issues in the short term. 
The previous section illustrated that several aspects of the current European regulatory 
framework appear to be relevant for platform markets, provided that a number of 
modifications are made. However, it also pointed to the danger of overregulation, and of 
prohibiting perfectly normal platform business models, if all current rules and suspicions are 
upheld. The challenge is thus to bring together some elements that may serve towards a 
realistic, forward-looking regulatory framework that can be applied to different platform 
models. 
The first aspect of such a framework is that it needs to operate across different 
technologies and markets. As argued earlier, given the emphasis of current European 
legislation and regulation of electronic communications on competition issues in the access 
market, upstream market developments are largely ignored. However, not only businesses 
with significant market power in access markets may abuse their position at the expense of 
their competitors and of end users, but increasingly, these access providers are dependent 
upon service providers, content providers, software and hardware manufacturers that are also 
in the position to abuse their power.  
The debate on regulating platforms in general is thus much wider than the current net 
neutrality debate, which is also concerned with the use and abuse of power exerted by 
platform companies over firms operating outside of their own relevant market, but which 
typically limits this discussion to network operators. It has been argued that keeping the focus 
of debate and regulation on only one type of platform companies (i.e. connectivity providers) 
inhibits the ability of these companies to effectively compete with other types of platform 
owners, in terms of organising ecosystems and presenting an attractive service portfolio to 
their customers. While most European observers appear to agree that it would be premature to 
abandon interconnection regulation, local loop unbundling and bitstream access rules, 
especially in the context of so-called next generation networks, the roll-out of fibre access 
networks, and the ‘Ladder of Investment’ hypothesis that most European regulators continue 
to adhere to, it has also been remarked that there is an imbalance with (the absence of) 
regulation of other types of platforms, which may have inter alia detrimental effects related to 
privacy, IPR and access to pluriform content and services. This calls for a regulatory 
approach that takes into account all market levels or ‘layers’ involved in the platform business 
model, as well as in competing platform business models (see also Renda, 2010). 
The second aspect is to focus on the logic of platform businesses and to withhold 
remedies that would penalise ‘normal’ platform behaviour. While the competition issues that 
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are distinguished by the current EU framework, as highlighted previously, can constitute an 
effective method for a theoretical and anticipatory analysis with regard to the types of 
platforms that pose most risks, it is far less evident that all the current remedies are useful in 
this new context (in this regard, see also the discussion in the section on policy concerns 
related to platforms in general). The bundling of services, the employment of cross subsidies, 
and temporary selling below cost at one side of the market may all be acceptable in platform 
markets, as they may lead to consumer surplus in the longer term. 
Still, measures such as transparency, non-discrimination and the obligation to negotiate 
(if necessary under supervision), may be relevant in various cases. And the more classical 
instruments of competition law, as translated into the measures of the Universal Access 
Directive, will be appropriate in a number of instances. Yet, as argued earlier, it is far from 
evident that these ought to be applied ex ante. 
In addition, when determining dominance or significant market power, it needs to be 
considered that market share as a measure of dominance or significant market power in multi-
sided markets is harder to establish, compared to the access markets that are traditionally 
scrutinised, and may also be less relevant, given the fact that smaller platform owners may 
also abuse their power through exclusivity measures, raising switching costs and so on. Still, 
it would appear sensible that platforms with less than 25 or 50 % (with the exact threshold to 
be investigated further) would be, as a rule, exempt from any particular regulation. It needs to 
be noted in this respect that the consumer market is an essential part of a market analysis 
aiming to establish significant market power. 
The third aspect is to consider different types of platform business models. As argued 
earlier, there have been several pleas to reorient the sector-specific framework towards the 
removal of specific bottlenecks. The platform typology as described earlier highlights 
different types of value and control configurations around bottleneck functionalities that 
platform owners employ. This typology identifies all actors involved in ICT service provision 
and consumption in a more abstract manner, and attempts to position them within a simple 
framework that enables an evaluation of their relative position within the struggle for 
platform leadership, and that may be fairly robust to technological and economic evolutions. 
What we propose is that such a platform typology, based on the distinction between having 
control or not over the customer relationship, and having control or not over many or most of 
the assets to ensure the overall value proposition, allows the assessment of a number of 
competition issues in an anticipative manner. This relates to questions such as who has 
dominance within a complex ecosystem of actors, who possesses the strongest bargaining 
position, who may function as a competitive bottleneck, and who may lock-in users.  
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It is clear that, while every platform may have dominance within the market where it is 
primarily active, not all types that we distinguish are as likely to bring about risks related to 
market distortion and abuse in complementary markets such as the supply of content and 
applications, the eventual service provision, and so on. Table 2 proposes a number of 
hypotheses related to the specific platform-related concerns, over and beyond the ‘normal’ 
antitrust concerns that each type of economic actor may bring about. It indicates that at least 
one platform model, i.e. the neutral platform, is unlikely to be sufficiently dominant to lead to 
strong anti-competitive risks at either side of the platform. Also, two other types only partially 
pose potential platform-specific concerns.  
 
Table 2: Platform Types and Regulatory concerns 	   No Control over Customers	   Control over Customers	  
Neutral Platform	   Broker Platform	  
The platform owner is strongly reliant 
on the assets of other actors to create 
the value proposition, and does not 
control the customer relationship	  
The platform owner is strongly reliant 
on the assets of other actors to create 
the value proposition, but does control 
the customer relationship	  
No 
Control 
over 
Assets	  
Regulatory concerns:  
- no specific concerns	  
Regulatory concerns: 
- Customer lock-in (raising switching 
costs)	  
- Price	  squeeze	  of	  service	  /	  content	  
providers	  
Enabler Platform	   System Integrator Platform	  
The platform owner controls many of 
the necessary assets to ensure the value 
proposition, but does not control the 
customer relationship	  
The platform owner controls many of 
the assets to ensure the value 
proposition, and establishes a 
relationship with end-users. Entry of 
‘third-party’ service providers is 
actively encouraged	  
Control 
over 
Assets 	  
Regulatory concerns: 
- Refusal to deal 
- Strategic design of products 
Regulatory concerns: 
- Customer lock-in (raising switching 
costs)	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   (interoperability)	  
- Lock-in of service/content 
providers	  
- Price	  squeeze	  of	  service	  /	  content	  
providers  
- Refusal to deal 
- Strategic design of products 
(interoperability)	  
- Lock-in of service/content 
providers	  
- Cross-subsidisation	  
 
The table can be interpreted as follows. While a neutral platform may be a dominant 
company, or a company with significant market power, it most probably cannot block other 
businesses in ways that cannot be resolved ex post by traditional competition law. Google, at 
the moment of its search engine-focused business model, may be the best example of such a 
platform. Meanwhile, however, Google’s ambitious extension of the platforms which it 
operates (e.g. Chrome, Android), and the end-user services which it offers (e.g. Gmail, 
Google Voice) probably require the company to be classified as another type of platform. 
Such business model evolution implies that regulators should not adopt a static approach, but 
should regularly monitor the market dynamics.  
The broker platform entails a number of additional risks related to its control over the 
customer relationship. These include customer lock-in (through raising switching costs) and 
overcharging service / content providers beyond what can be classified as ‘normal’ platform 
unbalances between the different sides of the market (see earlier). The enabler platform 
implies a number of additional risks related a.o. to refusal to deal, the strategic design of 
products, i.e. through various (non-)interoperability strategies, and the lock-in of 
service/content providers. 
Finally, the system integrator platform combines the potential concerns of the other 
types, and in addition may give rise to specific cross-subsidisation concerns. It has been 
argued that cross-subsidisation arguments in platform markets should be considered with 
some distrust. However, this does not mean that such concerns are always unfounded, in 
cases when platform owners are themselves also active at both sides of the platform. 
In summary, any ‘platform-aware’ regulatory framework, based on the EU tradition of 
regulating electronic communications markets, needs to operate across different technologies 
and markets, needs to focus on the logic of platform businesses and to withhold remedies that 
would penalise ‘normal’ platform behaviour, and needs to take into account different types of 
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platform business models. Furthermore, any typology used to characterise platform markets 
should be based on an analysis of the market situation, and provides an indication of 
competition issues that may be expected, or may not be ruled out. The preliminary overview 
of regulatory concerns associated with specific platform types, as presented here, would 
suggest that platform regulation will be first and foremost useful when a system integrator 
platform has dominance or significant market power related to a ‘layered’ or ‘multilevel’ 
market. 
 
Conclusion: Some Prescriptive Suggestions 
The rise of platforms in ICT markets invites a reappraisal of regulatory frameworks and 
practices. As platforms originating in entirely different sectors increasingly compete directly 
against each other, regulators ought to address platform competition issues regardless of their 
sector of origin, and taking into account the specificities of two-sided or multi-sided market 
business models. This paper identified different types of such business models in ICT 
markets. They differ primarily as to the control and value logic embedded in them. A 
tentative exploration of how such aspects could be taken on board for the regulation of 
electronic communications and ICT markets in Europe, pointed at a number of specific 
concerns that may arise related to specific platform types, and at a number of instruments 
available to current NRAs to address these concerns.  
It also briefly highlighted current debates and guidelines on net neutrality and the 
regulation of next-generation access platform providers, and their relevance for a potential 
expansion of such approaches to platforms in general. However, from this exploration, it 
appears far from certain that ex ante regulation of platforms will prove to be necessary, and 
certainly not as a general rule for all types of platforms. Still, further anticipative 
investigations ought to shed more light on the potential risks of market distortion and on a 
converged framework that may help NCAs and NRAs to be responsive to current market 
developments. 
So far, the European Commission has adopted a rather reactive attitude vis-à-vis the 
competitive relationships of ICT platforms. The Commission has mainly relied on classical 
competition rules to support a number of ex post reactions. As argued in this paper, a shift 
towards a more proactive attitude can be expected, and to a certain extent, welcomed. In light 
of the very limited grip of the NRAs and NCAs, especially those of small member states, on 
the development and conduct of international platforms, it is advisable to anticipate some of 
the measures at the European level. 
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At the very least, the EC should concern itself with the division of responsibilities 
between the EC (in collaboration with BEREC) and the NRAs related to these aspects; the 
potential issuing of ex ante recommendations or guidelines to Member States; and whether to 
provide guidance to platform owners on the possibility and modalities of incurring (ex post) 
investigations by the Commission or the NRAs because of certain strategies. 
One approach that seems appropriate is that the EC, on the basis of a theoretical 
definition of markets, centred on various platform business models, implements an instrument 
to describe the situations that would incur the largest risks of distorting the market in a more 
detailed manner, and subsequently develops the most appropriate regulatory tools. It appears 
that a number of sector-specific analytical tools may be helpful. Also, analysis may be partly 
be inspired by the existing remedies of the Directives and the recent Recommendation of 
September 2010 related to next-generation access networks. This would enable regulators to 
intervene more rapidly and more coherently, when and if necessary, without leading to static, 
ex ante regulatory measures or resorting to overregulation.  
The list of regulatory concerns specific to different platform types indicated that they 
relate to regulatory instruments already foreseen in the present NRA toolset. First and 
foremost, they refer to monopolisation rules and antitrust rules, and furthermore to 
transparency measures, obligation to negotiate, non-discrimination, quality of service 
thresholds, imposing interoperability and/or common technical standards and lastly cost 
orientation. In any case, it appears that sound and extensive business model analysis is crucial 
to inform regulators in which cases such measures need to be taken. 
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